Kampala, Uganda| In a fiery national radio address that has sent shockwaves across East Africa, President Yoweri Museveni declared Uganda’s landlocked geography a “major strategic threat” and warned that without reliable, sovereign-like access to the Indian Ocean, future conflicts in the region are inevitable.
“If regional cooperation continues to fail,” Museveni stated, “the ocean belongs to us, and in the future, wars may break out if care is not taken.”
The remarks, delivered in his characteristic blunt style, have reignited long-simmering debates about East African integration, the fragility of regional trade corridors, and the high cost of Kenya’s unpredictable politics for its landlocked neighbours.
A 30-Year Negotiation Marathon That Always Restarts at Zero
Museveni laid bare a frustration that has built over nearly four decades in power: every time Uganda reaches an agreement with Kenya on port access, pipelines, or railway extensions, a new Kenyan president takes office and the entire process collapses.
“I have been negotiating access to the Indian Ocean for 30 years,” he said. “Every time I finish with one president, another comes and we start again from zero.”
For landlocked Uganda, the Port of Mombasa is not just a trade facility – it is the country’s economic lung.
Over 80% of Uganda’s imports (fuel, cement, machinery, wheat, and consumer goods) and a significant portion of its exports (coffee, gold, and minerals) pass through the Kenyan coastal city.
Any political tremor in Nairobi translates into immediate price hikes, delays, and uncertainty in Kampala.
How Four Kenyan Presidents Turned Trade Corridors into Political Toll Gates
The Northern Corridor – the lifeline linking Mombasa to Uganda via the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), highways, and the oil pipeline – has been hostage to Kenya’s domestic political cycles:
- Daniel arap Moi era (until 2002): Heavy transit fees, endless roadblocks, and rampant bribery along the Malaba route.
- Mwai Kibaki era (2003–2013): Genuine progress – port expansion, one-stop border posts, and smoother customs procedures. Museveni has repeatedly described Kibaki as the most reliable partner he ever had.
- Uhuru Kenyatta era (2013–2022): Ambitious Chinese-funded SGR launched with promises to extend the line to Kampala and Kigali. Uganda pushed for a Ugandan “dry port” in Naivasha or Eldoret where its customs officers could clear goods inland, dramatically cutting delays and corruption. Agreements were signed.
- William Ruto era (2022–present): Many of Uhuru’s regional deals have been frozen or reversed. Cargo handling was recentralised to Mombasa, fuel pipeline agreements renegotiated, and the Naivasha–Kisumu–Malaba SGR extension remains stalled. Museveni’s dream of seamless, bribe-free access appears further away than ever.
The half-finished SGR currently terminates at Naivasha, forcing Ugandan cargo onto congested roads for the final 500+ kilometres – exactly the inefficiency the railway was meant to eliminate.
The Dry Port Dream That Became a Political Football
One of Museveni’s flagship proposals was the establishment of an inland container depot (dry port) deep inside Kenya where Ugandan customs and security officials would take control of cargo immediately after it leaves Mombasa port.
The arrangement would have:
- Slashed transit times from weeks to days
- Eliminated multiple bribe points
- Allowed Uganda to collect its own import duties rather than relying on Kenyan systems
The Uhuru administration gave the plan a green light. Land was identified, feasibility studies completed, and the project was marketed as a win-win for East African Community integration.
Yet under President Ruto, critics inside Kenya labelled it “a project to benefit Uhuru’s friends,” and momentum evaporated.
Today the facility remains a ghost plan – another casualty of Kenya’s habit of resetting regional commitments with every new administration.
Kenya’s Biggest Export: Policy Uncertainty
Beneath Museveni’s frustration lies a broader indictment: Kenya’s political system has turned the country’s greatest geographical advantage – its coastline – into a permanent bargaining chip rather than a reliable regional public good.
Investors, neighbouring countries, and even ordinary Kenyan citizens face the same problem: long-term planning is impossible when major policies can be overturned every five to ten years to suit new patronage networks.
As one Kampala-based trade analyst put it: “Kenya does not just export tea, flowers, and horticulture. Its biggest export to the region is uncertainty.”
Echoes Across the Region
Museveni is not alone in his grievances. Rwanda has diversified away from Mombasa by routing more trade through Tanzania’s Dar es Salaam port.
South Sudan, when not at war, has explored pipeline routes that bypass Kenya entirely. Even Burundi and eastern DRC are investing in the Tanzanian corridor.
For years, Kenya enjoyed near-monopoly power over Great Lakes trade. That monopoly is quietly eroding – and Museveni’s public outburst may accelerate the shift.
A Stark Choice for East Africa
The Ugandan leader’s warning of possible future conflict, while dramatic, underscores a simple strategic reality: no sovereign nation accepts permanent economic dependence on the political goodwill of a neighbour indefinitely.
Unless Kenya commits to institutionalising – rather than personalising – regional trade agreements, the East African Community risks sliding from uneasy cooperation into open rivalry over trade routes and, ultimately, access to the sea.
For now, trucks continue to crawl along the Northern Corridor, clearing one bribe post after another, while an unfinished railway rusts in the Kenyan highlands – a multimillion-dollar monument to the high cost of political musical chairs.
Museveni has delivered his clearest message yet: Uganda will keep negotiating in good faith, but it will not remain landlocked and vulnerable forever.
Whether East Africa’s leaders treat this as a wake-up call or another routine diplomatic flare-up will shape the region’s stability – and prosperity – for generations to come.
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